Nuclear program nobody talks about: Unveiling Israel’s nuclear arsenal

By Iftikhar Gilani

While the world remains obsessed with the nuclear programs of Iran, North Korea, and previously Pakistan, Israel’s opaque and undeclared nuclear arsenal continues to escape scrutiny.

According to the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Israel is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons. Estimates of its stockpile range between 90 and 400 nuclear warheads, and the country is believed to have developed a nuclear triad: air-launched bombs from F-15 and F-16 fighters, submarine-launched cruise missiles from Dolphin-class vessels, and the Jericho series of ballistic missiles capable of intercontinental reach.

Its first deliverable nuclear weapon is believed to have been completed in late 1966 or early 1967, which would make Israel the world’s sixth nuclear-armed nation. Despite this, it maintains a policy of ambiguity—never confirming nor denying the existence of its arsenal.

This nuclear opacity has come under renewed scrutiny after Israel’s large-scale airstrikes on Iranian nuclear, military, and missile facilities on Friday.

The strikes, which followed a period of heightened regional tension, were seen by many analysts as a message to both Tehran and the wider region about Israel’s enduring strategic capabilities, both conventional and possibly nuclear.

Giving voice to concerns nuclear expert Susi Snyder said there was now time for the world to discuss Israel’s nuclear program, which is also a threat to the region.

Despite global calls for transparency, Israel has not signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It argues that regional peace and mutual arms control agreements must precede any steps toward transparency. This position has allowed it to operate outside the international inspections regime that governs other nuclear powers.

In recent years, statements by Israeli officials have hinted at a more open acknowledgement of its capabilities. In recent times then-Heritage Minister Amihai Eliyahu in 2023, publicly suggested the possibility of using a nuclear bomb in Gaza, prompting swift condemnation and his suspension by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

While the remark was officially disavowed, it reinforced suspicions about Israel’s nuclear posture and readiness.

The history of Israel’s nuclear programme dates back to the years following its independence in 1948. With strong backing from France and covert procurement of key materials and technologies, Israel built the Negev Nuclear Research Center at Dimona.

Revelations by whistleblower Mordechai Vanunu in 1986 provided the first detailed public account of the program, showing photographs of advanced weapon designs, including thermonuclear warheads. Vanunu was abducted by Mossad in Rome and sentenced in Israel for espionage and treason.

Nuclear doctrine

According to renowned historian Avner Cohen, Israel formally articulated its nuclear doctrine in 1966, defining four “red lines” that could trigger a nuclear response. These red lines were:

1. A successful military incursion into Israel’s pre-1967 (post-1949 armistice) borders;
2. The destruction of the Israeli Air Force;
3. Massive and devastating aerial assaults or the use of chemical or biological weapons on Israeli cities;
4. A nuclear strike against Israeli territory.

The existence of these thresholds remained secret for years but shaped Israel’s strategic thinking in critical moments of its history.

Investigative journalist Seymour Hersh, in his book The Samson Option, claimed that Israel came close to invoking this doctrine during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. On October 8, just days into the conflict, Prime Minister Golda Meir and her top aides reportedly placed eight nuclear-armed F-4 Phantom jets at Tel Nof Airbase on 24-hour alert.

At the same time, nuclear missile launchers were activated at the Sdot Micha Airbase. Hersh noted that Israel’s initial nuclear targeting list included Egyptian and Syrian military headquarters in Cairo and Damascus. The alert was not merely defensive; it was intended as a signal—to the Soviets, urging them to rein in their Arab allies, and to the United States, pressuring it to begin a massive resupply operation for Israel’s depleted forces.

There are reports that a Soviet intelligence officer did in fact warn Egypt’s chief of staff about Israel’s nuclear posture. Meanwhile, officials close to U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger later acknowledged that the fear of a nuclear escalation contributed to the urgency behind Washington’s decision to launch a major airlift of military supplies to Israel.

Hersh also documented that, in the years before it acquired its own satellite reconnaissance capability, Israel engaged in covert espionage against the United States in order to obtain targeting data for Soviet installations—a critical piece in developing its second-strike and deterrence strategy during the Cold War.

Again, during the 1991 Gulf War, after Iraq launched Scud missiles at Israel, the country went on full-scale nuclear alert. Mobile nuclear-capable missile launchers were deployed as a precaution against a possible escalation involving chemical or biological weapons. Though Israel refrained from retaliating—largely due to American diplomatic pressure—this incident marked another instance where the possibility of nuclear use was seriously considered.

In the lead-up to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, Israeli officials again feared an unconventional weapons strike. After consultations with President George W. Bush, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon reportedly warned that if Israel were to suffer casualties from weapons of mass destruction—whether chemical, biological, or from a large-scale terrorist attack—there would be a devastating response. According to various Israeli sources, this included a possible nuclear retaliation, provided such an attack occurred before U.S. forces launched their invasion.

These moments reveal an evolving Israeli nuclear doctrine that is increasingly shaped by the concept of preemption. Whether facing conventional or non-conventional threats—chemical, biological, or nuclear—Israel has moved towards a posture that favors early, even anticipatory, action to neutralize existential threats.

Military analysts and strategic planners note that Israel’s nuclear policy, while never officially acknowledged, has become a cornerstone of its national security doctrine. Louis René Beres, a key contributor to the influential Project Daniel group, has advocated for further refinement and strengthening of this doctrine. He argues that Israel’s strategy should remain aligned with the United States’ increasingly preemptive nuclear posture, as outlined in the Pentagon’s Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations.

Deliberate ambiguity

Israel’s deliberate ambiguity about its nuclear capabilities—neither confirming nor denying possession—continues to serve as both a deterrent and a diplomatic shield. But in an increasingly volatile Middle East, with new forms of warfare and unconventional threats emerging, experts suggest that the long-held red lines may evolve—and with them, the risk calculus of nuclear use.

Successive Israeli leaders have viewed nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor of national survival, often invoking the Holocaust as justification for maintaining such capabilities. The so-called “Samson Option”—a deterrent strategy threatening massive retaliation in the face of existential threats—is emblematic of Israel’s approach.

The Begin Doctrine, formulated in the early 1980s, asserts that Israel will not tolerate any hostile regional power acquiring nuclear weapons. This doctrine has been enforced through military strikes: Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981, Syria’s suspected nuclear facility in 2007, and the Stuxnet cyberattack—allegedly carried out jointly with the US—on Iran’s Natanz enrichment facility in 2010.

Yet, Israel has continued to resist efforts to bring its nuclear programme under international scrutiny. In repeated UN resolutions and IAEA discussions, Arab states and other non-aligned nations have demanded that Israel join the NPT and subject its nuclear facilities to inspection.

Israel remains defiant, backed by longstanding U.S. policy which has, since the Nixon administration, accepted Israeli opacity in exchange for an undeclared understanding not to test or publicize its arsenal.

Israel’s delivery systems have evolved into a formidable triad.

According to researchers, its Jericho III intercontinental ballistic missiles are believed to be capable of carrying multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRVs) across continents.

The Israeli Air Force’s modified F-15I and F-16I aircraft can strike distant targets, as demonstrated in operations over Iraq and Syria. Its German-built Dolphin-class submarines are believed to carry nuclear-capable cruise missiles, providing a second-strike capability that ensures deterrence even if land-based assets are compromised.

The clandestine nature of Israel’s arsenal has drawn criticism for undermining global non-proliferation efforts. It also complicates U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East, where Washington’s selective enforcement of nuclear norms—pushing inspections in Iran while ignoring Israel—has triggered accusations of double standards.

In 2009, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter estimated Israel’s stockpile to exceed 300 warheads. In contrast, recent reports by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists suggest a more conservative figure of around 80, with capacity to build many more.

The Israeli programme was built with significant foreign help—primarily from France, which helped construct the Dimona reactor and provided reprocessing technology. Britain and Norway reportedly supplied heavy water and uranium, sometimes through covert or indirect channels. South Africa is also alleged to have cooperated with Israel on nuclear weapons development in the 1970s.

Despite the secrecy, a global consensus has formed among nuclear experts that Israel is a nuclear power. Yet, the lack of transparency means its capabilities, doctrines, and thresholds remain shrouded in uncertainty.

This ambiguity is intended to deter adversaries while avoiding the political costs of open acknowledgement. But critics argue it destabilizes regional arms control efforts and feeds insecurity among neighboring states, particularly Iran.

As Israel continues preventive operations against Iran’s nuclear facilities—as seen in the latest airstrikes—the contradiction in international nuclear discourse becomes even more stark. While Iran’s enrichment to 60% has drawn threats and sanctions, Israel’s alleged possession of hundreds of warheads remains largely unquestioned in diplomatic forums.

The core of the issue is geopolitical: Israel, with strong Western support, has carved out an exceptional status that exempts it from the rules applied to others. But as tensions rise across the Middle East, and nuclear threats re-emerge in political rhetoric, the long-standing silence around Israel’s nuclear programme is becoming harder to sustain.

For now, the world continues to look elsewhere—towards Tehran, Pyongyang, and even Islamabad—while the arsenal in Dimona remains in the shadows, unacknowledged, yet omnipresent.