Exclusive interview: Peace monitor warns stalled Bangsamoro process could fuel ISIS activity

By Iftikhar Gilani

The fragile peace process in the southern Philippines is facing a critical test. Hüseyin Oruç, vice president of the Turkish humanitarian organization IHH and a member of the Third Party Monitoring Team overseeing the Bangsamoro agreement, warns that stalled reforms and delayed elections are deepening frustration in the Muslim-majority region.

In an exclusive interview with MNTV, he says unfulfilled commitments and security gaps risk creating a vacuum that extremist groups, including ISIS-linked actors, could exploit if momentum is not restored. Excerpts of interview:

Q: You are part of the international mechanism monitoring arms decommissioning in Bangsamoro. Where does the process stand today, and what did you observe during your recent visit?

A: To explain where we stand today, we should first recall the context because this peace process did not start yesterday. The peace process between the Philippine government and the Bangsamoro Muslims has been very long. What we are discussing now is the current peace process that took shape when President Aquino and MILF Chairman Haji Murad Ibrahim met in Japan and agreed to pursue a new peace agreement. They chose Malaysia as the facilitator, and the early meetings were held in Kuala Lumpur. The negotiations progressed through milestones. Around 2012, there was the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, and in 2014, the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro was signed. In 2019 the new autonomous region was formed: the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, or BARMM. From the beginning, this peace process had two tracks. One track is political, meaning the transition toward legitimate, democratic governance in Bangsamoro. The second track is normalization, which covers demilitarization, reintegration, security sector changes and transitional justice. These tracks are supposed to move in parallel. If one stops, the other cannot remain stable for long. During my recent visit, I met different groups as part of the monitoring work. What concerned me most is that people, especially young people, are increasingly frustrated. When frustration grows, the peace process becomes vulnerable. That is why we keep emphasizing that implementation is not optional. It is the process.

Q: Let’s take the political track first. How was the transition supposed to work, and where did it get stuck?

A: Politically, the idea was to build a transition administration and then move to elections. Initially, the president of the Philippines appointed the members of the Bangsamoro Parliament and the chief minister. There are 80 seats in the parliament during the transition phase, and the chief minister leads the regional government. This system continued across different presidents. Aquino started the process, then Duterte came, then Marcos came. Each president had a different style and different priorities. And in the Philippines, the political system is very unique because a president serves only one six-year term. That means policies can shift sharply from one president to the next. In the first years especially, the president has very strong power and can influence the direction of governance. The original schedule was that elections should have happened earlier, but COVID-19 delayed everything. The first election was postponed to 2025. It was expected in May 2025, then postponed to October. Then the Supreme Court declared the local election code unconstitutional in October 2025, and elections could not be conducted. Recently, in the first days of 2026, the Bangsamoro Parliament passed a new election law, and now they are waiting again for the first election, somewhere between June and October. But even now, nothing is fully clear. There is a real possibility that the election may be postponed again and combined with the national election in 2028. If elections happen this year, the elected parliament may only have around a year and a half before the next national political cycle changes everything again. That uncertainty is damaging.

Q: You mentioned the electoral system is unique. Can you explain it in detail?

A: Yes. In the Philippines generally, there is a district-based election system where each district elects one representative. In Bangsamoro, there will be a mix. Thirty-two members of the parliament will be elected from districts. Eight seats are reserved for special sectors. These include youth, women, business sector representatives, religious scholars or ulema, traditional leaders like sultans and also Indigenous Peoples. And 40 seats will be elected through political parties. This is significant because political parties become institutionalized in a stronger way. This system has advantages because it can make representation broader and more structured. But it also creates pressure: the transition leadership must deliver enough progress so that the election feels meaningful to people, not symbolic.

Q: Now to normalization. The most visible part is decommissioning. What were the targets, what has been achieved and what remains?

A: The agreement set clear numbers: 40,000 combatants and 7,000 weapons were to be decommissioned. This was divided into four phases. Up to today, we are at the last phase. The number achieved so far is around 26,145 combatants decommissioned and about 4,500 weapons decommissioned. The last phase is about 14,000 more. But the process is stalled. The key issue is that the MILF says normalization obligations are not moving in parallel. The government asks for more decommissioning, but the government does not deliver on its own promises. When one side feels the other is not fulfilling responsibilities, the process stops.

Q: What exactly did the government promise in normalization, and what has not been delivered?

A: There are several major commitments. First is the socioeconomic package for decommissioned combatants. When you decommission a combatant, you must help him transition into civilian life. For this, the government promised about one million pesos per combatant. The first 100,000 pesos was to be cash, and the remaining 900,000 pesos was to support housing, land, livelihood, health needs and possibly scholarships for children. The problem is that for the more than 26,000 combatants already decommissioned, only received the 100,000 pesos cash portion. The remaining package is still not delivered. That means people decommissioned but did not receive the full support that was promised. It creates anger and mistrust. Second is dismantling private armed groups. In the Philippines, especially in Bangsamoro, many armed groups are tied to local politics: governors, mayors and even village leaders sometimes have their own armed men. The agreement recognized that if the MILF demilitarizes, these private armed groups must also be removed. Otherwise a vacuum forms and communities feel exposed. But there has been no meaningful progress on dismantling those groups. Third is the redeployment of government forces. There are many Philippine army bases in the region. The agreement envisioned that as decommissioning progresses and new policing structures develop, the army footprint would reduce. But the army remains. There is no major movement. Fourth is policing reform. The police are supposed to be under Bangsamoro authority in a meaningful way. One idea was to integrate around 7,000 members of MILF and MNLF members into the police. This would make the police more representative and build confidence. But so far, only around 400 have been absorbed, and there may be no further progress. Fifth is transitional justice and reconciliation. There were supposed to be laws at both national and regional levels to ensure past injustices are recognized and not repeated. That has not advanced the way it should. There is some progress for amnesty. A special committee was formed. Around 1,000 registrations have been completed, and the committee prepares lists to submit to the president for amnesty decisions. This can ease legal problems for many individuals, but it is only one part of normalization.

Q: You said the MILF suspended decommissioning in August 2025. Was the suspension mainly because of the socioeconomic package issue?

A: The socioeconomic package is a major issue, yes, because it is the most direct promise to individuals. But it is not only that. The broader problem is the imbalance: the MILF believes it is meeting obligations, while the government is not meeting its obligations. Add to that the political interference and leadership crisis, and the situation becomes much more serious. When normalization stalls and politics become unstable, decommissioning is not just a technical process. It becomes a political statement. The MILF’s suspension was a message: we cannot continue giving up our leverage while the agreement is not respected.

Q: Let’s talk about the political controversy you raised. What happened with the Bangsamoro Transition Authority appointments?

A: Under the transition arrangement, the Bangsamoro Parliament and the chief minister were supposed to come from the MILF, because it is the main party that signed the agreement and is decommissioning combatants. During the transition, 41 seats were associated with MILF recommendations, and 39 seats were appointed by the president to include other Moro factions and sectors, making the parliament more representative. From Aquino to Duterte and in the early period of Marcos, the government generally respected the MILF’s list for those 41 seats. The president used the 39 seats for other groups like the MNLF and for broader representation. But in March 2025, President Marcos appointed a new Bangsamoro Transition Authority and did not follow the MILF list fully. The MILF submitted 41 names, but only 35 were appointed. More importantly, Haji Murad Ibrahim, the MILF chairman and key figure of the peace process, was not appointed as chief minister. Instead, Abdulrauf Macacua was appointed. This had a major impact on the ground. The MILF sees it as interference that undermines the agreement and attempts to divide the movement.

Q: Who is Abdulrauf Macacua in this context, and why did his appointment become so controversial?

A: Macacua is a senior figure in the MILF and linked to its armed wing leadership. The concern for many within the MILF was not only the person, but the method and the signal. It looked like Manila was choosing a leader rather than respecting the MILF’s internal legitimacy and the agreement’s structure. Inside the MILF, there are major leaders, including Haji Murad Ibrahim, Mohagher Iqbal and Abdulrauf Macacua. Haji Murad is considered the symbol and long-time leader. Mohagher Iqbal is known as a key negotiator, firm on what was agreed, and seen as a hardliner by some in government. Macacua was seen as someone the government could work with more easily. So the appointment created the perception that Manila was trying to manage MILF politics from outside. Many people in the MILF remembered what happened to the MNLF in the early 2000s, when fragmentation and political maneuvering weakened a previously strong movement. They fear the same pattern is being repeated.

Q: How did the MILF respond internally?

A: Initially there was intense debate. Some wanted to dismiss Macacua and declare that the government was interfering and dividing the Muslims. Others argued that elections were approaching and it would be better to avoid a public split. They said, he is our son, let us keep unity until elections, then decide leadership through internal mechanisms and public legitimacy. That approach led to attempts at quiet negotiation between Macacua and the MILF Central Committee. But as elections were postponed again, Macacua began changing cabinet positions and moving further from the Central Committee. Over time, the division became clearer. Many within the MILF say that 90 percent support Haji Murad and the Central Committee. A smaller group, often connected to parliament seats or bureaucracy positions, aligns with Macacua. The split is real and visible. There were also allegations against some ministries associated with MILF leaders, including police raids and corruption accusations. But as described, many of these accusations did not proceed to court. Raids occurred and documents were collected, but no clear legal outcome followed. Some believe these actions were politically aimed. One prominent figure mentioned was the education minister, described as having a strong reputation among people, making it difficult to remove him without backlash.

Q: As a monitor, what do you tell both sides? Are you in touch with all parties?

A: Yes. This is our obligation. Both parties invited the Third Party Monitoring Team. There are five members, with an independent chair from the European Union. The team is funded by the EU. We include representation connected to both sides, but decisions are made by consensus. Our role is to monitor implementation of agreements and laws and provide advice. Our advice is confidential. We write to both sides and also report to Malaysia as facilitator. We have been clear: the appointment issues are against the agreements. During transition, you cannot demand that an armed movement decommissions and at the same time exclude it from political leadership. That is not how trust-building works. If parties want a new arrangement, they can sit and negotiate again, but they cannot unilaterally change the structure and expect the other side to continue as if nothing happened. The election is probably the most important solution, because it allows people to decide. But elections themselves must happen credibly and on time.

Q: You used a strong phrase: you said parties have lost not just trust but respect. Why is that distinction important?

A: Trust is crucial in any peace process, but respect is the foundation. You respect the other side’s identity, rights and role. Then you trust that they will fulfill commitments. If respect disappears, trust cannot survive. On one side, the government must respect that Bangsamoro Muslims are historically rooted in the region and have legitimate rights. On the other side, the MILF must respect the state structure enough to transition from armed struggle to governance under autonomy. The agreements were built on this mutual respect. But after the leadership controversy and stalled normalization, respect has been damaged. That is extremely dangerous. Our job as monitors and third parties is to help restore respect first, then trust, then implementation.

Q: How real is the threat of ISIS taking advantage if the peace process continues to stall?

A: Unfortunately, it is very real. If there is no progress, people become frustrated. Young people lose hope. When that happens, extremist groups have an opening. They can present themselves as the alternative. In the past, when the MNLF split after 2001, many young people moved toward the MILF because it was seen as a local, legitimate and disciplined movement. It became the reasonable alternative. But today, if the MILF weakens or becomes divided, the alternative is not another moderate movement. The alternative is ISIS-linked networks. That is what makes this moment so dangerous. There are already incidents that show ISIS-linked activity. There was an ambush in which soldiers were killed and there were suicide attacks targeting local officials. There are armed people across the region and recruitment can happen quickly if anger grows and if the security environment becomes confused. This is why I keep saying the peace process is not only about politics. It is about preventing a vacuum. If a vacuum forms, ISIS can fill it.

Q: You cited Marawi as a lesson. What happened there, and how does it shape your assessment now?

A: The Marawi siege was a major shock. ISIS-linked groups took control of Marawi City, which is known as an Islamic city in the Philippines. The government response was extremely heavy. Much of the city was destroyed. Many people were killed, including those described as ISIS members but also civilians. After Marawi, ISIS influence decreased significantly. But the current environment is different. When people lose faith in peaceful change, the atmosphere becomes favorable again for extremist recruitment. So even if ISIS was weakened after Marawi, it can regroup in a context of stalled peace, political disputes and unfulfilled promises.

Q: You also spoke about Syria. What parallels do you see, and what is different?

A: Syria is very different in scale and complexity, but there are lessons. As mediation, trust is central. In Syria, multiple actors, regional powers and international interests complicate everything. In Bangsamoro, the conflict is more political and localized. That should make it easier to manage, but only if agreements are respected. In Syria, IHH has been involved in humanitarian operations and corridors that require trust from different actors. When parties trust the mediator or humanitarian actor, it becomes possible to deliver aid and support stabilization. That trust can also support dialogue. In Syria, the Kurdish-related conflict is another example. The only sustainable option is integration of Kurdish groups into the Syrian system. The Syrian leadership has made declarations recognizing Kurdish identity, which is significant. The challenge is whether the Kurdish groups trust those declarations, and whether guarantees exist. Third parties can play a role in creating trust. If trust is missing, even good declarations can fail.

Q: In the interview, you raised claims about ISIS being used by powerful actors and about prisons. What is your point there?

A: The point is that ISIS does not exist in a vacuum. In different conflicts, we have seen extremist groups emerge and grow when states collapse, when prisons become recruiting grounds and when powerful actors manipulate instability for strategic advantage. We should remember that extremist networks can be transferred from one theatre to another. If there are prisoners, fighters or networks in one region, they can move. That is why I worry that if Bangsamoro becomes unstable again, it can attract external extremist elements as well. I also referenced Iraq as an example of how political destabilization can create space for extremist groups to surge. Once such groups grow, civilians pay the price.

Q: Shifting to Palestine, you spoke about Gaza and IHH’s aid work. What are you doing there and what do you see on the ground? A: In Gaza, the level of destruction is massive. Many buildings have been destroyed. The number of deaths is difficult to verify; different estimates exist, and some sources claim very high figures based on certain calculations. What I can speak about clearly is our humanitarian work. From the beginning of the war, our teams and offices in Gaza have been active across the area. A major program has been community kitchens. Daily, we prepare and distribute food at very large scale, serving hundreds of thousands of meals. We also support makeshift facilities for schools and hospitals, using tents and rehabilitating parts of buildings that remain standing. Even if mass killing declines at certain times, the suffering continues: winter conditions, displacement, lack of adequate shelter and medical crisis.

Q: Are you involved in political facilitation in Gaza as well? Do you coordinate with Israeli authorities?

A: We are not in political coordination with the Israeli government in the sense of peace facilitation. The Israelis are not happy with IHH because of our role in initiatives like the Freedom Flotilla. We have offices in Egypt as well, and we work with Palestinian communities there, including large numbers of people who have left Gaza. There have been announcements about Rafah possibly opening. If it opens both ways, some people may leave, and more relief may enter. But we do not know how it will be shaped. I do not believe any plan that aims to remove Gaza’s people is a solution. A pause may provide temporary relief, but the political problems remain unresolved. The key question is who secures Gaza and under what framework. If security is imposed by foreign forces, resistance groups will not trust it. If there is international Islamic representation for security, that may create different possibilities. Trust is again central.

Q: Finally, returning to Bangsamoro, what is your concluding warning, and what would you like to see happen next?

A: My concluding warning is simple: what happened to earlier movements has lessons, but the current moment is more dangerous because the alternative to a weakened MILF is not a more moderate faction. The alternative is ISIS-linked networks. There are thousands of armed individuals on the ground. If the peace process is stalled, if politics remain uncertain, if decommissioned combatants do not receive promised reintegration support and if private armed groups remain active, then recruitment becomes easier for extremists. That would be disastrous for Bangsamoro and the Philippines as a whole. I have just returned from Bangsamoro, and I saw something I had not seen in years: for the first time in 13 years, young people were openly talking about independence again. Historically, they believe independence is their right. The question is how they pursue that aim. If a legitimate local vehicle exists, people can stay within political pathways. If the MILF is perceived as unable to deliver, then the “vehicle” can become extremist. I told both the government and MILF officials that ISIS has been used in other theatres to destabilize and reshape regions. The same game can be played again. Stabilizing Bangsamoro is not only in the interest of Bangsamoro Muslims. It is in the interest of the Bangsamoro government, the Philippine government and all Philippine citizens. The ball is in the hands of the Philippine government. They must correct the course, fulfill normalization commitments, respect the agreements and support credible elections. If both sides understand the danger and act responsibly, the process can return to track. If not, the vacuum will grow, and ISIS will take advantage.