Mediator or messenger? Pakistan’s role tested in Iran crisis
As Islamabad facilitates high-stakes communication, Pakistani analyst argues its deterrence and diplomacy have elevated its status — even as regional conflict and global shifts deepen
By Akhtar Pathan
KARACHI, Pakistan (MNTV) — As analysts worldwide credit Pakistan’s diplomatic brinkmanship with helping avert a potential nuclear confrontation — if one takes Donald Trump at his word — a Pakistani political scientist frames the moment as a continuation of the military dominance the country established over India during the May 7–10, 2025, aerial showdown.
Muhammad Osama Shafiq, a Ph.D. scholar and director of the Institute for Media & Social Dynamics in the United Kingdom, says the respect Pakistan commands today among Muslim nations and in the wider world is a direct outcome of what he describes as its resolute stand against a far more powerful rival.
He argues that one of the principal reasons the United States has leaned on Pakistan in its precarious engagement with Iran is Washington’s awareness of Islamabad’s “proven deterrence,” which he says has the potential to alter the rules of the game if Pakistan were to enter the conflict under any circumstances.
At the same time, he calls it a “million-dollar question” whether Pakistan can capitalize on what he describes as a rare, perhaps once-in-a-generation moment — leveraging diplomatic momentum to rebrand itself and translate international recognition into tangible domestic political and economic gains.
Shafiq says the current government, buoyed by what he calls a significant diplomatic victory, is likely to face little immediate political resistance. Yet he questions its capacity to convert this favorable climate into lasting advantage.
“I think the present government, currently basking in this diplomatic victory on the global stage, which is no small feat by any standards, will have smooth sailing in the days ahead and will not have to face any major opposition,” he says. “But it lacks the capacity to cash in on this rare outpouring of domestic and global support.”
He adds that the government has already failed to translate favorable conditions into financial gains, citing what he describes as a missed opportunity for Karachi to position itself as an alternative regional port hub after the destruction of Dubai. According to him, several shipping companies initially considered Karachi but reversed course due to infrastructure shortcomings.
‘Messenger’ Pakistan emerges as trusted mediator
Pakistan’s role in the deepening crisis has become increasingly central, with Shafiq describing its diplomatic performance as widely acknowledged on the global stage. He points to commentary on BBC that characterized Pakistan’s role as a “masterstroke.”
India, he says, is unlikely to welcome Pakistan’s prominence, given longstanding tensions and concerns over Islamabad’s growing military and diplomatic profile. Indian analysts, along with some Pakistani critics, have argued that Pakistan has functioned merely as a “messenger” rather than a true mediator.
Shafiq rejects that characterization as reductive.
“Most wartime diplomacy consists of acting as a trusted go-between, passing messages between sides that have zero trust in each other,” he says. “That in itself is a critical function.”
He emphasizes that Pakistan is not a party to the conflict and stepped in only after other communication channels — including those involving Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and China — had effectively closed.
He also notes that Pakistan is neither a guarantor nor positioned to become one. “China is or can be a guarantor,” he says, adding that Pakistan’s rising geopolitical weight is nonetheless evident in the planned U.S.-Iran talks in Islamabad, which he describes as proof of its growing relevance.
Pakistan will not act against Iran
Shafiq firmly rules out the possibility of Pakistan taking part in any military action against Iran, including in the event of a Saudi-led initiative.
“Pakistan will confine its role to diplomacy and mediation,” he says. “It will never become part of any attack on Iran, nor will it itself ever attack its neighbor from its soil.”
He acknowledges that the United States exerted pressure on Pakistan to open a second front against Iran but says Islamabad refused.
In the event of a Saudi attack, he says, Pakistan’s involvement would likely be limited to defensive deployments under existing agreements, aimed at preventing escalation rather than participating in offensive operations.
“There is not even the remotest likelihood that Pakistan will ever attack Iran,” he says, adding that such a scenario has never figured in Pakistan’s military strategy.
‘Iran has already won the war’
Shafiq interprets Trump’s decision to step back from what he describes as a “doomsday threat” and extend a self-imposed deadline as a sign of a leader under pressure.
“He has ensnared himself in an escalation trap, which is multiplying war costs by each passing day,” he says.
According to Shafiq, the prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz placed severe strain on the global oil system and the petrodollar, pushing the United States into what he calls a “do or die” situation. He argues that Washington faced stark choices: escalate dramatically, potentially altering Iran’s geography, or find a way to de-escalate.
Use of nuclear weapons, he says, would have amounted to “crossing the Rubicon,” setting a precedent for other powers to deploy nuclear arsenals in their own geopolitical disputes.
“I firmly believe that since Trump had utterly failed to find any way out of the war of choice he had started, he has only managed to get a breather,” Shafiq says. “The war has not yet ended.”
He contends that Iran has played its strategy effectively. Despite airstrikes, bombardment and the killing of senior officials, the government remains intact.
“By inflicting pain on global oil markets and supply chains and effectively blockading the Strait of Hormuz, the Iranian regime has already won this war by all standards,” he says.
‘No lasting peace until Israel is reined in’
Shafiq argues that the history of Israel demonstrates a consistent pattern of undermining peace efforts, driven by what he describes as strategic incentives tied to prolonged conflict.
He cites the killing of Ismail Haniyeh and members of his family during negotiations as evidence, saying such actions were intended to derail diplomatic processes. When talks continued despite those events, he notes, Haniyeh himself was later killed in Tehran in July 2024 while serving as a key negotiator.
Shafiq says the perception of Israel as a spoiler is no longer limited to pro-Palestinian voices, pointing to remarks by Joe Kent, as well as analysts such as Jeffrey Sachs and John Mearsheimer.
Kent, he notes, warned that any U.S. effort to reach a deal with Iran would require restraining Israel, which he described as capable of derailing diplomatic initiatives.
‘Ceasefire merely a prelude’
Shafiq believes ongoing talks are aimed at achieving only a temporary ceasefire rather than a durable peace.
“The war will not end until Israel is reined in,” he says, listing Gaza, Lebanon, Baitul Maqdis, the West Bank, the Golan Heights, Syria and Jordan as interconnected arenas of conflict.
He cites restrictions on religious sites, including closures of Al-Aqsa Mosque during Ramadan and limitations on Christian observances, as factors fueling tensions.
“I foresee the war will resume after a temporary pause,” he says. “It may continue for half a year, an entire year, two, three, four or five years.”
Call for a regional alliance
Shafiq advocates for a collective security arrangement among major Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran and Turkiye, as a means of stabilizing the region.
“The only viable strategy to stop Israel is with the help of a regional alliance of four major Muslim nations,” he says, while acknowledging uncertainty about how events may unfold.
‘Birth pangs of a multipolar world’
Shafiq argues that the current conflict signals the end of the postwar “rules-based order” and the emergence of a new global structure.
He points to the absence of the United Nations in key mediation roles and to vetoes by Russia and China on a Bahrain-backed resolution concerning the Strait of Hormuz as evidence of shifting dynamics.
According to him, both Moscow and Beijing have moved beyond the sidelines, openly aligning themselves in the Iran conflict. He also highlights evolving energy trade patterns, including Russian oil sales to northern markets and Iranian exports to China despite sanctions.
“The petrodollar, which forms the foundation of the world economy, has greatly weakened,” he says, predicting that sanctioned countries will increasingly bypass it in favor of alternative currencies such as the yuan.
Shafiq envisions a multipolar order in which power is distributed among regional blocs.
“I see America confining itself to the transatlantic, China controlling Asia, Russia its region, and Europe managing its own sphere,” he says. “Emerging regional power blocs will have to rewrite a new Magna Carta to run the affairs of the world.”
Whether that transformation unfolds peacefully or through further conflict, he adds, remains uncertain.