Makkah defense pact: New security order or symbolic alliance?
Pakistan-Saudi Arabia-Türkiye accord promises collective defense, but divergent interests, unclear adversary and questions over its mutual-defense clause raise doubts about its viability
By Akhtar Pathan
KARACHI, Pakistan (MNTV) — Pakistan’s leading analysts contend the Makkah Joint Defense Agreement (MJDA) is not akin to NATO as its inherent contradictions reduce it to more of a symbolic than a transformative defense framework.
Imtiaz Gul, political analyst and counterterrorism expert, says the tripartite defense agreement among Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye has drawn mixed reactions across the Middle East and South Asia.
He says while some leaders, officials and analysts hail it as a historic reordering of the regional security architecture, a closer examination reveals deep-seated contradictions that could make a seamless partnership exceedingly difficult.
For now, the pact appears more symbolic — a declaration of intent — rather than a transformative shift in geopolitical or security dynamics, he says.
The tripartite understanding emerged against a backdrop of shifting strategic realities. Iran has already pierced the Gulf states’ long-standing security framework, which had been heavily pegged to American military bases in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar. For these Gulf nations, the U.S. defense umbrella has increasingly proven to be a liability rather than a reliable shield, he argues.
This context raises fundamental questions: Is the MJDA a solid political declaration born out of shared security fears, or does it create legally binding defense obligations akin to NATO’s charter? And if it is primarily a signaling exercise, then to whom is the signal directed?
He says the Houthis’ continued attacks on Saudi Arabia — both immediately before and after the pact’s signing — underscore a central challenge. Can a collective defense commitment translate into credible deterrence against Iran-aligned armed groups? So far, the attacks suggest that the mere formation of the alliance has not altered their strategic calculus, he asserts.
A riddle wrapped in enigma
Gul says several complications further undermine the MJDA’s viability:
Divergent threat perceptions and priorities: Pakistan remains heavily focused on India and Afghanistan, though it eyes an opportunity to export military hardware to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia prioritizes Gulf security and economic diversification, while Türkiye must balance its NATO obligations with its ambitions in Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean and its own defense exports, he says.
Geographic and strategic disconnect: The three nations share no geographical proximity, and their strategic interests often diverge rather than converge.
U.S. and Israel dynamics: If the alliance enjoys quiet U.S. backing — given that all three are currently Washington allies — it would effectively preclude any confrontation with Israel. Similarly, it is unlikely to generate deterrence against India, with which both Saudi Arabia and Türkiye maintain close ties. At best, geopolitical expedience, likely nudged by American pressure, may steer the group toward facilitating the Abraham Accords. Many observers already view this pact as another link in that chain, he argues.
The absence of a clear adversary: NATO was forged against a common ideological and transnational threat: Soviet communism. What enemy unites the MJDA? Iran? Israel? Certainly not China or Russia, he adds.
Raises more questions than answers
Gul asserts the hypothetical scenarios only deepen the skepticism, and raises further questions. Would Pakistan openly join combat operations in a Saudi-Iran conflict, given that its 20% Shia population and 900-kilometer border with Iran severely constrain its political and military options?
How would Türkiye and Saudi Arabia respond in the event of an India-Pakistan conflict?
Would Pakistan and Saudi Arabia rally behind Türkiye if Israel attacked it? The agreement’s stance on Israel versus Iran remains vague.
Can Pakistan’s navy act as a naval shield, akin to the U.S. Navy alongside Israel in recent conflicts? Experts contend it lacks the requisite capability.
What would symbolic troop deployments achieve in an era dominated by aerial warfare and unmanned aerial vehicles?
Given these inherent contradictions, he contends, the tripartite agreement hardly promises an easy marriage. In reality, it looks more like a symbolic pact than a transformative defense framework.
Erratic winner Pakistan may lose fresh gains
Gul says the development, along with Pakistan’s mediation efforts, has generated unusual goodwill abroad and may yield some monetary gains through security services or soft loans. However, Pakistan has experienced similar moments of regional prominence before — under Field Marshal Ayub Khan, General Ziaul Haq and General Pervez Musharraf.
A glance at the country’s governance, rule of law and economic indicators today tells a sobering story, when viewed against Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi’s claim that the “present system has totally flopped.” Internally, Pakistan is more politically polarized than ever, while facing an unprecedented surge in insurgency and proxy terrorism that stretches its armed forces to the limit, he says.
He believes bold thinking can propel nations forward, but megalomania often blinds one to reality, inviting stagnation if not outright failure. Unfortunately, Pakistan’s political economy and foreign policy history point more to the latter than the former.
Ultimately, he says, one must ask: Would member states jeopardize their long-term economic interests if one of them were attacked by a country with whom the others maintain close security and economic cooperation? On current evidence, the odds of cohesive collective defense appear steeply stacked against the MJDA.
‘Pact neither symbolic nor political, nor NATO-like’
Former ambassador Sanaullah, with decades of diplomatic experience, says the recent development involving the defense pact between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye is neither symbolic nor merely a political statement, nor is it a NATO-type alliance. Rather, it marks the institutional beginning of a new regional security architecture involving three powerful players in the Islamic world, he argues.
Pakistan possesses a large and powerful army as well as nuclear weapons. Türkiye, too, has a powerful military, extensive NATO experience, substantial naval power and a sophisticated defense industry. Saudi Arabia provides a powerful air force, centered on one of the world’s largest concentrations of advanced 4.5-generation combat aircraft, along with sophisticated intelligence, command-and-control, air-defense and precision-strike capabilities.
Pakistan faces risks only in Iran-Saudi war scenario
Sanaullah says Iran, however, is aware of Pakistan’s tangible involvement in providing regional security as per its bilateral defense pact. Pakistani forces are deployed alongside Saudi forces and have participated in the defense of the Kingdom.
Pakistan could find itself in a difficult position if a direct conflict were to erupt between Iran and Saudi Arabia. As far as Iranian proxies in Iraq and Yemen are concerned, however, Pakistan does not need to be overly concerned, he says.
“I believe the United States is not particularly worried about the pact; it must have given its go-ahead. The agreement is not anti-America. Rather, it can be viewed as an insurance policy against uncertainty surrounding the reliability and durability of U.S. security protection for Saudis.”