Judgment in Asiya Andrabi case draws scrutiny over court’s reasoning

MNTV News Desk

NEW DELHI, India (MNTV) — A sentencing order by an Indian court against Dukhtaran-e-Millat (DeM) chief Asiya Andrabi and her co-accused has come under scrutiny, with legal observers raising concerns that the court’s reasoning relied on contested ideological interpretations and subjective assessments rather than established legal standards.  

Hafiz Ahmad Khokhar, Advocate of Supreme Court of Pakistan, expressed serious legal concern over the judgment. He stated that the judgment is not legally sound and raises significant questions regarding compliance with due process under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, which guarantee equality before the law, protection against arbitrariness, and the fundamental right to a fair trial. 

According to him, the prosecution relied on broad allegations lacking independent corroboration, falling short of the standard required to sustain a conviction under established criminal jurisprudence.

Commenting on the legal reasoning, he observed that the court’s reliance on confessional material, ideological affiliations, and political narratives—without rigorous evidentiary scrutiny—reveals a substantial lacuna in applying the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. 

Such an approach undermines transparency, impartial adjudication, and the foundational safeguards of the criminal justice system. He further highlighted a broader trend in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir, where anti-terror laws are increasingly used against political dissent, raising serious concerns about the erosion of civil liberties.

From an international legal perspective, he emphasized that criminalizing political advocacy linked to self-determination, absent proven incitement to violence, risks conflating dissent with terrorism. 

He referred to Article 1(2) of the UN Charter and Articles 14 and 19 of the ICCPR, which guarantee fair trial and freedom of expression, noting that the judgment appears inconsistent with internationally recognized legal standards.

He cautioned that inadequately substantiated prosecutions could erode public confidence in judicial institutions. The case of Asiya Andrabi represents a broader political struggle, raising complex questions regarding freedom of expression and the right to self-determination. 

Khokhar stressed that judicial credibility depends on fidelity to constitutional safeguards, due process, and credible evidence, calling for fair, transparent, and impartial administration of justice—standards that, he noted, were lacking in this judgment.

Meanwhile, an analysis published by the Kashmir Times said that the judgment identifies three key aggravating factors underpinning the severe sentence: the propagation of “Iqamat-e-Deen” (upholding of religious principles), the absence of remorse, and the accused’s articulation of Kashmir as a political dispute. 

It stated that the treatment of these elements raises questions about evidentiary thresholds, judicial reasoning and constitutional safeguards. 

Central to the criticism is the court’s reliance on “Iqamat-e-Deen” as indicative of intent. While the judgment notes that DeM “stands for Iqamat-e-Deen,” it does not define the concept or examine its varied interpretations within Islamic scholarship. Instead, it appears to draw on a limited academic source to characterise the idea, without engaging with broader or widely recognised scholarly work. 

Such an approach risks conflating a theological concept with criminal intent without establishing a clear nexus to unlawful activity. The prosecution’s allegations—including conspiracy, ideological mobilisation and use of media platforms—require demonstrable evidence of intent and consequence, rather than reliance on an undefined religious framework. 

The second major point of contention is the court’s emphasis on the “absence of remorse” as an aggravating factor. Observers note that remorse is inherently subjective and difficult to measure, raising concerns about its weight in sentencing decisions. Indian sentencing principles require punishment to be proportionate and based on objective criteria, including the nature of the offence and its consequences.

Elevating lack of remorse could shift the focus from proven conduct to perceived beliefs or attitudes, potentially conflicting with protections against self-incrimination and the principle that criminal liability must rest on evidence.

The judgment has also drawn attention for its treatment of the accused’s position on Kashmir. The prosecution framed their statements on Kashmir as part of a broader conspiracy against the sovereignty of India. The distinction between political expression and criminal conduct appears insufficiently examined in the ruling.

In the absence of a clear and proximate link to incitement or violence, the articulation of a political viewpoint—however contentious—falls within the domain of protected speech in a democratic framework.

Further scrutiny has focused on what critics describe as a limited consideration of mitigating factors. Defence submissions cited the age, health conditions and prolonged pre-trial incarceration of the accused, along with the absence of a demonstrated causal link between their actions and any specific instance of violence or public disorder.

Such factors are typically central to sentencing decisions under established jurisprudence, particularly in assessing proportionality.

Taken together, the judgment has prompted broader questions about how courts interpret ideology and assess intent in criminal cases. The reliance on a narrowly sourced interpretation of a religious concept, combined with subjective measures such as remorse, risks blurring the line between belief and culpability.