Kazakhstan’s delicate balancing act with Moscow and Washington
Tokayev’s Nov. 6 visit to Washington and his Nov. 11 trip to Moscow produced sharply different optics, highlighting Kazakhstan’s multi-vector diplomacy
By Akhtar Pathan
KARACHI, Pakistan (MNTV) — When Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev landed in Moscow on Nov. 11 for a state visit, he was greeted with a warmth that felt almost familial.
Russian President Vladimir Putin welcomed him with deliberate displays of respect and warmth, making the point that the Central Asian country is an indispensable partner, not just another neighbor.
Five days earlier, on Nov. 6, Tokayev had been in a very different setting. In Washington, he joined the other Central Asian leaders for the C5+1 summit with the U.S. President Donald Trump.
The meeting was courteous but formal. The five presidents sat in a row, taking turns reading short statements in Trump’s presence. There were no separate bilateral sessions, no gestures suggesting a special relationship.
The contrast between these two visits captured the essence of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy: hedging between great powers, maintaining working ties with all, and refusing to allow any one country to dominate its strategic choices.
This “multi-vector” approach has long shielded Kazakhstan from tension between global powers. But as the geopolitical landscape shifts, the middle ground is becoming narrower.
Tokayev’s Nov. 6 appearance at the White House highlighted a reality Central Asian leaders already know well: the United States sees the region primarily through a collective regional lens. Though the summit marked renewed American engagement, the optics were unmistakably hierarchical.
Washington treats Central Asia as a bloc. It does not grant Central Asian leaders the individual importance they receive in Moscow.
At the White House, Tokayev was one among five. At the Kremlin he was the only special guest. Putin received him as a long-standing partner. The choreography — extended talks, carefully framed public remarks and warm body language — signaled Moscow’s respect for Kazakhstan’s strategic importance.
It sent a clear message to all quarters concerned that Putin does not view Central Asia as a monolith. He knows Kazakhstan’s demographic mix, its geography and its role as a bridge to China, and he treats Tokayev as an individual leader of consequence.
That treatment reflects Kazakhstan’s unique position in Russia’s worldview: large, resource-rich, politically stable and home to a sizeable Russian-speaking population.
Origins of multi-vector doctrine
Kazakhstan’s ability to maintain equidistance from competing powers is rooted in its early independence years. Nursultan Nazarbayev, the country’s founding president, developed the multi-vector policy to avoid entanglement with any single power.
“From Nazarbayev to Tokayev, Kazakhstan’s leaders have adhered to neutrality with remarkable discipline,” said Moonis Ahmar, former dean of social sciences at Karachi University.
“They are not expected to abandon it, because it is a core element of their national strategy.”
That strategy is reinforced by demography. Close to three million ethnic Russians live in Kazakhstan, primarily in the north. The decision to shift the capital in the 1990s from Almaty to the newly built Astana was partly motivated by the need to strengthen state presence in this sensitive region.
“The Russian population makes it impossible for Kazakhstan to offend Moscow,” Ahmar said. “Neutrality is not just smart. It is structural.”
Navigating sanctions pressure
The war in Ukraine has brought fresh pressure on Kazakhstan to take sides. Western governments want Astana to help squeeze Moscow economically. Kazakhstan has refused, instead choosing a cautious middle path: it does not recognize Russia’s annexations, but it also does not endorse sanctions.
“Kazakhstan’s refusal to join sanctions is a logical continuation of its multi-vector policy,” said Faisal Javaid, head of the International Relations Department at Federal Urdu University in Islamabad. “It preserves space for maneuver.”
Javaid argues that Kazakhstan has become critical to Russia’s ability to weather sanctions. “Russia relies on Kazakhstan as a transit corridor. It keeps supply chains open and offers alternative commercial routes.”
But Western sanctions create their own complications for Astana. Kazakhstan’s oil exports still move largely through Russian territory to Europe. Disruptions in Russian transit routes threaten Kazakhstan’s economic stability.
Middle Corridor push
To reduce Kazakhstan’s dependence on Russian routes, the United States and its allies are promoting the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, known as the Middle Corridor.
The route links China to Europe via Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan and Türkiye.
“The Middle Corridor is promising, but it will take years to match the reliability of the Russian route,” Javaid said. “Kazakhstan cannot afford to abandon its traditional transit path.”
Washington views the corridor as a way to weaken Moscow’s regional influence. But for Kazakhstan, the project is primarily an economic hedge, not a political realignment.
Russia has shown little discomfort with Kazakhstan’s broadening economic ties with China. What worries Moscow is Western political influence in Central Asia. “Russia accepts Kazakhstan’s expanding trade with China,” Javaid explained.
“What it fears is a deeper U.S. presence.”
Uranium is an example of this delicate balance. Kazakhstan supplies more than 20 percent of the EU’s uranium needs and over a quarter of America’s. Moscow tolerates this as long as it does not undermine its role in global nuclear fuel markets.
For regional analyst M. Ibrahim Farooqi, Kazakhstan’s balancing act is not merely pragmatic — it is existential. “Kazakhstan borders Russia and China, two major world powers in strategic tension with the West,” he said. “Taking sides would be unwise.”
He argues that multi-vectorism is not an ideological posture but a protective mechanism. “Kazakhstan has never allowed its ties with one major state to compromise the interests of another.”
Trade numbers reflect that. Kazakhstan conducts roughly $45 billion in annual trade with the European Union and more than $4.2 billion with the United States. “In strategic affairs, mutual interest matters more than rhetoric,” Farooqi said. “That is why Kazakhstan continues to engage everyone.”
Tokayev’s experiences on Nov. 6 in Washington and Nov. 11 in Moscow show that Kazakhstan is still managing to hold its neutral line. But the room for neutrality is shrinking.
The U.S. is pushing for clearer alignments. Russia is increasingly sensitive to shifts in its neighborhood. China is expanding its strategic footprint.
Kazakhstan’s response so far has been consistent: avoid antagonizing any power, keep all channels open and use its geography as leverage. But the world around it is changing at a pace that may soon force harder choices.
For now, the polite handshakes in Washington and the warm smiles in Moscow tell the same story: Kazakhstan is still walking the middle path. Whether that path remains open in the years ahead is the question Tokayev will have to answer — sooner rather than later.