Farewell to arms: Türkiye’s Kurdish militant group announces dissolution 

After four decades of conflict, the PKK announces its dissolution and disarmament in a move guided by Abdullah Ocalan—ushering in a new phase of political negotiation, with far-reaching regional and geopolitical implications

By Abdul Hamid Chohan

MNTV Analysis

In a historic development that could reshape Turkish politics and regional stability, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has announced its dissolution and the end of its armed struggle.

The declaration, delivered following the group’s 12th Party Congress held between May 5 and 7, marks a watershed moment in the decades-long conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurdish militant movement.

Issued in the name of the party’s congress board, the statement concluded that “all activities under the PKK name have been concluded,” with the group formally laying down its arms. The process, the PKK affirmed, will be supervised and led by Abdullah Ocalan, its imprisoned founder and long-time ideological figurehead, who first signalled the move in a February 27 communiqué.

Founded in 1978 amid political suppression and systemic denial of Kurdish identity, the PKK took up arms against the Turkish state in 1984. Rooted in Marxist-Leninist ideology and drawing inspiration from national liberation struggles, the organisation fought for greater autonomy and cultural rights for Türkiye’s estimated 15 million Kurds.

The conflict has claimed over 40,000 lives, displaced hundreds of thousands, and cost the Turkish economy more than $2 trillion, according to government estimates. Türkiye, the United States, and the European Union designated the PKK as a terrorist organisation, further complicating its political legitimacy.

Despite intermittent ceasefires and peace efforts over the decades—most notably in 1993 under President Turgut Özal and again during the “Peace Process” of 2013–2015—the violence persisted. The failed 2015 truce, collapsed by mutual distrust and provocations including the assassination of Turkish policemen in Ceylanpinar, dashed hopes for reconciliation.

The PKK’s statement places its dissolution in the context of “moving from armed resistance to a just and legitimate political process,” aligning with Ocalan’s long-held aspiration to transition the Kurdish movement into peaceful democratic participation.

Ocalan has been imprisoned on Imralı Island since 1999. Though isolated, he remains a pivotal player in Kurdish politics. His recent messages and authorised visits by family and political allies—such as DEM Party MP Omer Ocalan and former peace negotiators—culminated in the group’s final decision to disband.

Turkish intelligence agency MIT, under its new chief Ibrahim Kalin, reportedly played a key role in orchestrating the delicate negotiations that led to the announcement. Officials are now in the process of verifying the disarmament on the ground, particularly in Iraq and Syria, where PKK-linked forces have a heavy presence.

Road to terror-free Türkiye

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan welcomed the development as a major step towards internal peace. “We are moving with firm steps toward a Türkiye without terror,” he declared. Erdogan has long framed the conflict as a battle for national sovereignty and unity, and now sees an opportunity to translate military success into political stability.

The timing is also politically advantageous. Erdogan’s ruling AK Party, having suffered recent electoral setbacks, could regain momentum by presenting the dissolution of the PKK as a diplomatic and national security victory. 

Analysts like Gonul Tol of the Middle East Institute suggest that resolving the Kurdish question may pave the way for Erdogan to consolidate power further, potentially securing a constitutional amendment and extending his political tenure beyond 2028.

Meanwhile, Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli, traditionally a staunch critic of Kurdish political demands, has emerged as a surprising proponent of the peace effort. His call for Ocalan to address parliament was seen as instrumental in kick starting the process, marking a sharp rhetorical and strategic shift.

Despite the landmark announcement, the practical challenges of post-conflict transition remain daunting. Turkish authorities are now tasked with verifying disarmament, locating weapons caches in Iraq and Syria, and dealing with approximately 300 senior PKK members—including Cemil Bayik and Murat Karayilan—some of whom may be relocated to third countries like Norway or South Africa.

Others, such as fighters with no criminal records, may be allowed to return to Türkiye, starting with individuals linked to the high-profile “Diyarbakir mothers” case. The Turkish judiciary is reportedly considering amendments to the Execution Law that could enable the release of elderly and terminally ill inmates.

Partial amnesty, constitutional reforms, and changes to penal legislation remain on the table, but all are contingent on the completion of disarmament and the confirmation by MIT that no active PKK cells remain.

There is also discussion around the reinstatement of elected Kurdish mayors who had been replaced by government trustees during past security crackdowns. The restructuring of the DEM Party, which many critics claim has operated under PKK influence, will be pivotal. The dissolution offers the party a path to becoming a mainstream pro-Kurdish political platform independent of militant legacy.

Regional implications

The PKK’s move holds profound implications beyond Turkish borders. In Syria, where the group’s affiliates—the YPG and PYD—formed the backbone of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), their future remains uncertain. While the SDF has played a key role in the fight against ISIS, Ankara views it as an extension of the PKK.

Plans are reportedly underway for the integration of YPG fighters into the Syrian Arab Army, coordinated in consultation with the Assad regime. Non-Syrian PKK members will likely be expelled from Syria’s northeastern border regions.

In Iraq, the mountainous Qandil region—along the PKK’s military headquarters—will see a joint monitoring mechanism established with Baghdad to oversee disarmament. These developments could recalibrate Türkiye’s often fraught relations with its neighbours, especially Iran and Iraq, both of which have historically hosted or tolerated PKK bases.

Internationally, the disbandment presents a litmus test for the global community. The US and EU, having supported Kurdish groups during the Syrian civil war, now face the challenge of helping reintegrate Kurdish movements into legal political frameworks while preserving regional stability.

While the PKK’s dissolution may signal the end of one chapter, the next phase—peacebuilding—is arguably more complex. Transforming a movement forged in insurgency into one fully embedded in democratic politics will require time, trust-building, and meaningful institutional reform.

Key questions persist: Will Türkiye revise its Constitution to reflect multiculturalism and decentralisation, long-standing Kurdish demands? How will education and local governance be adapted to include Kurdish language and representation? Will there be a broader national consensus, or will polarisation deepen?

Ocalan’s continued imprisonment and potential political rehabilitation remain sensitive issues. Though he is expected to remain in Imralı, his ideological influence is likely to increase. For many Kurds, Ocalan is seen not just as a guerrilla leader, but as a symbolic figure of resistance and dignity.

Electoral calculus

Former AK Party MP Samil Tayyar has suggested that elements of the process—including partial amnesty, reinstatement of mayors, and reorganisation of DEM—may be timed with Türkiye’s political calendar. With general elections expected in 2028, or potentially earlier in spring 2027, Erdogan may look to capitalize on Kurdish goodwill.

Yet any perception that the process is being instrumentalized for political gain could spark backlash, particularly among nationalist constituencies. Erdogan has acknowledged the fragility of this moment, cautioning, “There may be those who want to benefit politically… we must be prepared.”

The Turkish opposition, fragmented and weakened, will also need to rethink its position. A failure to engage constructively with the peace process could isolate them further, especially if the DEM Party consolidates support among Kurdish voters and urban liberals.

For Erdogan and Bahceli, the vision of a “Terror-Free Türkiye” is not just a slogan—it’s a defining ambition. Ending the PKK insurgency would not only boost their domestic standing but also enhance Türkiye’s image globally as a country capable of resolving its internal conflicts through negotiation rather than force.

The economic dividends of peace could also be significant. Restoring stability to the southeast, attracting investment, and reducing defence spending may help Türkiye navigate its current financial challenges. A “rising and shining” Türkiye, as some officials describe it, will need to deliver on the social contract of reconciliation.

The PKK’s decision to dissolve itself marks the end of one of the bloodiest insurgencies in modern Middle Eastern history. Yet disarmament alone does not guarantee peace. Lasting stability will require inclusive governance, legal reforms, and above all, political courage.

The real test will be whether Türkiye can transform this milestone into a meaningful reconciliation between the state and its Kurdish citizens. If successful, the post-PKK era may well be remembered not only for ending a war—but for birthing a new, pluralist Turkish democracy.