Blame game diplomacy: Türkiye in crosshairs of Indo-Pak tensions

With New Delhi failing to rally international support and its diplomatic efforts yielding little sympathy, frustration has spilled turning Türkiye into latest target of nationalist indignation

By Iftikhar Gilani

As India fought a brief limited war with Pakistan, an unlikely target has come under fire—Türkiye.

With New Delhi failing to rally broad international support and its diplomatic outreach yielding little sympathy, frustration at home has found a new outlet.

Public anger and media outrage, along with Islamabad, have now begun to spill over onto Ankara, turning Türkiye into the latest object of nationalist indignation.

The result? A sudden spurt of calls for boycotting Turkish tourism and trade, and even talk of encircling Türkiye militarily by aligning with Greece, Armenia and Israel is trending in India.

But how did Türkiye, a country hundreds of miles removed from the South Asian theatre, become the villain in this narrative?

The answer lies in the mixture of misinformation, geopolitical posturing, and some self-inflicted diplomatic myopia.

India’s Ministry of External Affairs recently defended its anti-Türkiye stance by claiming Ankara had failed to condemn the Pahalgam attack in Jammu and Kashmir that killed 26 Indian tourists.

However, a quick check on the Turkish Foreign Ministry’s website reveals a statement dated April 22, just hours after the attack—clearly condemning the incident in no uncertain terms.

This raises a disturbing question: Is India selectively ignoring facts to manufacture a foe?

This echoes the “with us or against us” rhetoric of post-9/11 America under George W. Bush.

For a mid-level regional power like India, adopting such absolutist diplomacy not only appears unrealistic but also risks damaging long-term foreign policy interests.

India’s powerful lapdog media may have successfully created an impression of strategic brilliance—projecting images of military triumph and diplomatic success, but the truth is that global analysts see a different picture this time.

The kind of worldwide support India garnered post-Pulwama militant attack in 2019 is conspicuously absent this time.

Military experts suggest that India’s advanced Rafale jets were neutralized by Pakistani forces using Chinese technology.

So, if anger needs to be vented at arms suppliers, why is Türkiye being singled out instead of China?

At the military and diplomatic briefings Indian officials have claimed that Pakistan used some 300–400 Turkish drones. However, military analysts who saw the pictures presented by India say they were all Chinese drones.

Did Pakistan use Türkiye’s advanced Bayraktar TB series military drones? The answer by Indian officials was “no”. At most, Türkiye’s ‘Songar’ surveillance drones—low-range and non-lethal—were deployed for reconnaissance.

The hyped-up Turkish military connection turned out to be a case of misdirection.

Compare this with India’s supply of Akash missiles, fighter jets and other arms to Armenia during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Neither Türkiye nor Azerbaijan made a diplomatic issue of it. Why the double standards?

Drone Power

Let us not forget, Türkiye has earned a global reputation as a drone superpower.

During a recent press briefing in Ankara, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recounted how Turkish Bayraktar drones helped stall Russia’s advance on Kyiv in the early hours of the 2022 invasion.

These drones evaded Russian air defences and destroyed tanks with pinpoint precision. Similar tactical superiority was evident in Türkiye’s engagements in Syria, Libya, Azerbaijan, and Ethiopia.

And yet, in the recent India-Pakistan skirmish, there is no evidence that Türkiye’s combat drones played any role. Only surveillance models were reportedly used.

When questioned further, Indian officials are also citing the docking of Turkish warships in Karachi and the landing of Turkish military aircraft in Islamabad as provocations. But it turned out that the ship was merely refuelling en route from South Korea to Istanbul.

In fact, when India launched missile strikes into Pakistan on May 7, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called a high-level emergency meeting.

According to insiders, the session lasted only 10 minutes, during which Erdoğan directed his party and aides to work for restraint and prioritize peace in South Asia. Despite deep military ties with Pakistan, Ankara chose de-escalation over confrontation.

Turkish sources suggest that while Türkiye supports peaceful relations between India and Pakistan, but in the event of full-scale war, Türkiye’s historical military cooperation with Islamabad—dating back to the 1974 Cyprus crisis—could make neutrality difficult.

Even so, India’s economic threats are hardly credible. Türkiye’s imports from India constitute just 0.2% of its total, and Indian tourists make up only 0.6% of its tourism influx. If Ankara were to retaliate, it could hurt Indian business interests more.

The trade balance heavily favors India, and nearly 200 Indian companies have offices in Istanbul, İzmir, and Antalya, many operating through Türkiye to access the EU market under the European Customs Union.

Historical relations and global positioning

Relations between the Indian sub-continent and Türkiye have deep roots—far beyond present-day politics. During the Balkan Wars in 1912, Indian doctor M.A. Ansari led a medical mission to aid wounded Turkish soldiers.

Among his team was Abdur Rahman Samdani alias Peshawari, a student from Aligarh who sold all his belongings to support the Turkish cause.

While others returned, Peshawari stayed, fought in the Gallipoli campaign, and became the first reporter for Anadolu News Agency. He hailed from a Kashmiri family originally from Baramulla, which later migrated to Peshawar. His brother, Mohammad Yunus, served India as a top diplomat and trade envoy.

In fact, the modern Turkish bank “İş Bankası” was partly established using funds donated by South Asian Muslims.

Up until the mid-20th century, Turkish was spoken across Ladakh, a part of Jammu and Kashmir especially among Argun Muslims—descendants of Turkish traders.

The Galwan Valley is named after Ghulam Rasool Galwan, an Argun explorer, while the remote desert of Daulat Beg Oldi takes its name from Turkic noble Sultan Said Khan from the Oldi tribe.

In a recent visit to Türkiye, Indian foreign policy expert C. Raja Mohan noted that both countries, as emerging 21st-century regional powers, cannot afford to isolate each other. While Türkiye’s occasional support for Pakistan and comments on Kashmir irk New Delhi, Ankara is equally uneasy about India arming Armenia and backing Greece on Cyprus.

Veteran diplomat M.K. Bhadrakumar, once India’s envoy to Ankara, points out that while Türkiye’s military ties with Pakistan are real, they do not pose the kind of strategic threat that China’s alliance with Islamabad does. He advises Indian leaders to avoid emotional diplomacy and focus on strategic interests.

Türkiye, increasingly a player on the global stage—from mediating between Russia and Ukraine to shaping policy in Africa and Latin America—cannot be ignored. Even Russia, whose war plans were frustrated by Turkish drones, continues to view Türkiye as a reliable peace broker. Unlike India, Moscow has not resorted to boycotts or diplomatic tantrums.

New Turkish role

According to Professor Umair Anas of Yildirim Beyazit University, Türkiye now sees South Asia as a securitized region tied to its own national interests. Ankara and Riyadh quietly agree on the importance of Pakistan’s military strength. With NATO ties cooling, Pakistan has become Türkiye’s top non-NATO defence partner.

In the past, Türkiye offered to help mediate Indo-Pak tensions, including on Kashmir, in exchange for closer strategic cooperation with India. Despite Erdoğan’s repeated overtures, such efforts were often lost in diplomatic missteps.

From 2019 to 2022, relations between New Delhi and Ankara were at their lowest. That period saw both sides fuelling media narratives against each other. It coincided with India revoking Jammu and Kashmir’s special status, giving rise to the nationalist slogan “India First”—which some experts interpret as “India Alone.”

This stance diverges from the Gujral Doctrine, which advocated unconditional support for neighbours. In recent years, though, there has been a slow reset in India-Türkiye ties. But as of now, India lacks a comprehensive Türkiye policy—responding reactively rather than strategically to events.

Türkiye is not just Pakistan’s ally, and India cannot define itself solely through its alignments with Armenia or Greece.  Instead of boycotts and blame games, the real message should be: Reconnect, dialogue, and build new partnerships.

Both India and Türkiye are regional heavyweights seeking new roles in a shifting global order. A peaceful India—one that believes in resolving conflicts through dialogue—is the need of the hour.

India’s leaders need to understand that civilizations cannot afford to retreat into isolation or arrogance. The future lies in intellectual exchange, open dialogue, and strategic foresight—not hashtags and hysteria.